As popularly used, the term &dquo;governance&dquo; implies broad general responsibility for an organization, its survival, and its well-being. The process or act of governance is typically distinguished from that of management or supervision. Governance involves both the setting of organizational goals and the development of strategies for their achievement, using the and approve the overall organization of the hospital and the delegation of authority therein; (7) ensure that the community is well informed
Virtually all hospitals (by state articles of incorporation) are expected to establish and maintain a board of trustees. Starkweather (1988) sug- gests that hospital trustees traditionally have had eight functions to perform : they have been charged to (1) establish institutional goals and major policies; (2) ensure that plans and programs are developed to meet corporate goals; (3) provide for the long-range financial well-being of the organization; (4) establish and maintain qualified and functioning medical staff; (5) appoint and evaluate the chief executive officer; (6) review and approve the overall organization of the hospital and the delegation of authority therein; (7) ensure that the community is well informed concerning the organizations goals and performance; and (8) establish and maintain good procedures for conducting the affairs of the board, including the evaluation of its performance.
These functions, which derive from the &dquo;corporate&dquo; model of governance, are usually viewed as the legislated or prescribed roles, rather than the actual roles, performed by hospital boards. Indeed, Starkweather sees these functions as being carried out in a rather passive fashion by hospital boards. He notes that seven of the eight functions enumerated are usually initiated by others in the organization and are simply presented to the board for ratification. Cast in these terms, the overriding governance function in hospitals might be seen as stewardship, with trustees serving as caretakers to protect and safeguard the assets of a hospital (Shortell 1988) .
Until recently, health care organizations could afford the luxury of such passive stewardship, since governance functions were carried out in the context of a positive, supportive environment. Trustees were serving in a &dquo;time of plenty,&dquo; an era of cost-based reimbursement, when the willingness of society to spend money for health care and to dedicate resources to its maintenance and expansion seemed to be unlimited. Beginning in the early 1980s, however, the environment of health care organizations began to change in significant ways. These changes were characterized by increased concern about the continuing rise in the cost of medical care, substantial alteration of the financial system,.shifts in the political and legal environments of health care, and important demographic trends, including the rapid aging of the population.
These and other changes have led, in less than ten years, to a far more uncertain and turbulent environment within which hospitals and their boards must function. In response to these changes, hospitals themselves have adopted new strategies and organizational structures that have placed governing boards at the vortex of change in their institutions. It falls to governance, for example, to determine ways of allocating scarce resources in the community interest, and even to define health care organizations as, in fact, community service organizations or as competitive business entities instead. According to some, trustees will be increasingly called on to provide strategic direction for the organization, to offer specific expertise; and to encourage risk taking (Barrett and Windham 1984; Shortell 1988; Starkweather 1988 ).
This generally turbulent environment-and changes in legal definitions of board accountability in both the care quality and financial management spheres of hospital operation, together with the general demand for lower hospital costs-has produced a flurry of recent articles in hospital journals concerning the performance of hospital boards and the extent to which certain board &dquo;models&dquo; can lead to better hospital performance. Underlying much of this discussion is the assumption that an optimum board structure can be defined, and that the closer a hospital is to achieving that structure, the better its overall levels of performance will be. Further, that &dquo;optimum&dquo; structure is always a departure from traditional board structure, as generally defined, and rarely is it acknoivledged that boards have changed over time as hospital organization, medical technology, and hospital environments have changed.
In general, our (Barocci 1981 (Abbot 1981; Cunningham 1985; Mott 1984; Jellison 1983) , governing board effectiveness (Bader and Associates 1983; Kovner 1985; Ewell 1987; Wilson 1984) , governing board evaluation (Moses 1986a,b; Umbdenstock 1987; Huizenga and Anderson 1984) , trustee-chief execu-tive officer relations (Ewell 1983; Doody and Fish 1980; Moses 1986a,b) , trustee-physician relations (Friedman 1982; Thompson 1979; Castele 1986 Castele -1987 , trustee involvement in the community (Dawson 1982; Cohen 1986 ), liability issues related to trusteeship (Blaes 1982; Bernstein 1983 ), and quality assurance (Jessee 1984; Williams and Donnelly 1982 Barrett and Windham (1984) attempted to assess the relationship between particular board types and hospital effectiveness as mea'sured by a series of financial indicators. They found that board effectiveness depended not only on the congruency between the goals of the chief executive officer (CEO) and the board chairman, but also on the relationship between board type and the hospitals environment. Boards characterized as &dquo;analyzer&dquo; and &dquo;prospector&dquo; boards, which actively engage in environmental scanning and adjusting, were more effective in competitive environments than were &dquo;defender&dquo; and &dquo;reactor&dquo; boards, which tend to focus on internal efficiency.
Several earlier studies focused on the relationship between board composition and hospital performance outcomes. One of the first (Shortell, Becker, and Neuhauser 1976) assessed the relationship between management involvement in board activity and support department costs. In hospitals whose administrators were voting members of the board, nonmedical support departments were found to have experienced lower costs than in hospitals whose administrators were not voting members. The same study found that the percentage of reports prepared and sent to the board was more important in terms of lowering costs than was the total number of reports prepared for the board. These results suggest a potential link between board access to information and effective performance.
The same authors focused more broadly on compositional issues and board effectiveness in a later study (Kaufman, Shortell, Becker, et al. 1979) . They found that the presence of physicians on the board was related to a smaller percentage of board members from the financial and business community; however, occupational variables did not seem to be correlated with either cost or quality of care measures. Hospitals with administrative and physician representation on the board did not outperform those with more traditionally composed boards.
Finally, in a study that considered a variety of internal organizational characteristics and their relationship to hospital costs, Sloan and Vraciu (1983) Perhaps most important, however, is the fact that a majority of these studies have been insufficiently grounded in theory, which has led to an unsystematic approach to governance research, particularly in the assessment of governance effect on hospital performance. More theoretically based research on hospital governance has focused on several specific topics concerning either internal power relationships, the external roles of governing boards, or change in board roles over time. We turn nozv to a review of the literature on each topic.
HOSPITAL BOARD POWER AND AUTHORITY
As discussed earlier, in the past, hospital governing board authority and responsibilities in internal decision making were not clearly defined.
In some hospitals the board of trustees played an active role in policy and program development, but in many other institutions the board performed largely ceremonial functions and either delegated or abdicated much authority for corporate decision making to the chief executive officer, the medical staff, or one or two very active board members (Morlock, Nathanson, and Alexander 1987; Prybil 1980) . This state of affairs is reflected by a nearly complete omission of the topic of board power and authority in the management and research literature on health care organizations.
Economic models of hospitals, for example, typically viewed the hospital organization as essentially a physicians' cooperative (Pauly and Redisch 1973) . Others employed an exchange perspective in which the only relevant actors were managers and medical staff (Jacobs 1974; Harris 1977) . This perspective reflects the more general theory of managerial hegemony, which defines a board as nothing more than an extension of managements power over the organization resulting from managerial control over the selection of outside directors (Williams 1979) . As described by Kosnik (1987) , outside directors selected by management are &dquo;expected to rubber-stamp managements policies&dquo; (p. 167). Unfortunately, most comparative studies of hospital decision making have also failed to examine the influence of trustees in relation to other groups within the institution (Shortell 1974; Roemer and Friedman 1971; Morse, Gordon, and Moch 1974; Shortell, Becker, and Neuhauser 1976; Scott, Flood, and Ewy 1979) .
Although seldom applied to studies of hospital boards, agency theory (Fama 1980) provides an alternative perspective that combines issues of board composition, effectiveness, and power/authority. Agency problems arise in corporate settings because the separation of ownership (stockholders) and professional management (agents) leads to self-interested behavior on the part of the managers. A board's internal monitoring function supposedly serves as a possible monitoring mechanism to guard against opportunistic management behavior. According to Kosnik (1987) , effective board monitoring depends on the boards identification with stockholders' interests, and board members' expertise in decision making (i.e., the exercise of authority rights). In the hospital sector, the issue of ownership and control is increasingly complex, as corporate restructuring, merger, and service unbundling can lead to a blurring of the profit/notfor-profit distinction. To the extent that multiple &dquo;stakeholder&dquo; groups can be identified, agency problems presumably translate into bargaining among various interest groups vying for representation in the dominant coalition (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978) .
In one of the few empirical studies related to board power and authority, Kaluzny and Veney (1972) Contributing to the general ambiguity regarding the boards role and function are two important paradoxes. Morlock, Nathanson, and Alexander (1987) and Provan (1988) Kovner (1974) showed that a gap existed between the areas considered of highest priority by board members and the areas they considered themselves most qualified to handle. Areas of most concern were cost control, quality of care, and relations with third party payers. The area of greatest expertise for the majority of the board was capital investment. Ritvo (1980) revealed similar findings on board process and function. His analysis of 121 Ohio hospitals indicated that boards seemed to spend their time coping with the problems at hand rather than anticipating those of the future. Ritvo found that boards relied heavily on internal data as opposed to external information to detect areas of concern. Not only ivas environmental scanning being neglected, but the result of this overreliance on internal data was an additional time delay in responding to external problems, depending on the length of time it took for external problems to be recognized or captured, or both, on internal data. Ritvos conclusion was that this sort of information-processing structure, which focuses on internal affairs, results in a crisis-management, rather than strategic-planning, approach to governance in hospitals (Ritvo 1980 (Alexander and Fennell 1986 (Kaufman, Shortell, Becker, et al. 1979; Kovner 1974; Pfeffer 1973) . Theoretically, the base from which-these external roles were derived can be found in Thompsons (1967) Resource-dependence theory has also been used to study the roles and structures of governing boards (Pfeffer 1973; Cook, Shortell, Conrad, et al. 1983 (Palmer 1983; Ornstein 1984; Mizruchi and Koenig 1986 ). An interlock means that the same individual is sitting on the boards of two organizations. As summarized by Mizruchi and Koenig (1986) Mizruchi (1983) argues that board power is most likely to be asserted during the handling of major problems or strategic decision points. In a related vein, Kosnik (1987) has argued that the effect of boards on organizational performance and change is likely to be confined to particular incidents in which the board actively intervenes in the organizations strategic decision making in order to prevent management from making decisions in conflict with stakeholders' interests. Thus, Kosnik maintains that accurate insights into the relationship of board governance and organizational change would only result from studies of situations where the board is potentially faced with &dquo;acute governance problems and choices&dquo; (p. 164). Indeed, the boardroom is the one place where different external influences of the organization meet regularly to discuss and essentially to control decisions and actions of the organization.
Of the three types of broad-phase problems Zald discusses, the most telling are life-cycle problems, particularly problems of (1) organizational genesis, (2) character formation and transformation, and (3) basic identity crisis. Organizational genesis describes the situation in which a new corporation is organized or established. In such cases, the attention is paid to formulation of policy, rules for managers and boards, and formulation of guidelines for action. To deal with decisions regarding organizational genesis, boards meet regularly and often, and board power and influence are continually used and called on (Zald 1969 (Whetten 1987, 338 Hannan and Freemans (1984) and Pfeffer's (1982) notion of change in core attributes of the organization.
Criteria for defining such changes include: (1) changes in the stated goals of the organization; (2) changes in the forms of authority within the organization; (3) changes in core technology; (4) changes in the kinds of clients or customers to which the organization orients its production, or in the ways it attracts resources from the environment; and (5) changes in the fundamental identity or autonomy of the organization as they pertain to loss of organizational culture or power to control organizational destiny, or both. As mentioned previously, the role of governing boards in either pursuing or blocking such profound changes is poorly understood. We suggest that to answer the question &dquo;Do boards make a difference?&dquo; requires an analysis of governing board influence on these crucial decisions.
As we have seen in our review of various literatures on board role and functions, governing boards play different roles under different sets of conditions, and board structures vary across hospitals. It is quite likely that particular board structures may be more or less likely to influence decisions to profoundly change a hospital's structure. We would also suggest, following Zald (1969) , that the hospitals life-cycle stage should be included as an important contextual variable that may change the relationship between board structure and the likelihood of decisions to merge, restructure, or otherwise radically change a hospitals structure.
In the next section we present two basic models of board structure and hypothesize how these board models may influence decisions to pursue or block various profound organizational changes.
A SYNTHESIS OF PREVIOUS RESEARCH AND THEORY ON BOARD STRUCTURE
As an aid in synthesizing this lengthy review of governance and governing board structures, we turn to two conceptual models recently developed by Alexander, Morlock, and Gifford (1988) for predicting differences between governance in restructured and nonrestructured hospitals : philanthropic and corporate board models. The philanthropic model, similar to Mintzberg's &dquo;board service role&dquo; (Mintzberg 1983) , is based on descriptions of boards of nonprofit organizations, while the corporate model is derived from descriptions of boards of directors in the private sector (Johnson 1986) . Although the philanthropic model shares some of the symbolic functions stressed by Starkweather (1988) , its role is more often to be actively engaged in traditional boundary-spanning activities. The corporate model, by contrast, is generally more strategically oriented.
Eight key characteristics of these two board types are presented in 1. Board Size. Philanthropic boards are characterized by a large number of members owing to the voluntaristic nature of their activity and the broad range of interests they represent (Pfeffer 1973 ). Historically, the major role of hospital trustees has been to maintain or enhance the legitimacy and prestige of the insti- (Pfeffer 1973 ). This is due to the influence of a wide range of constituencies and stakeholders in philanthropic organizations in contrast to the narrower shareholder representation role assumed by most corporate boards (Johnson 1986 (Ewell 1982 (Pfeffer 1973; Kovner 1978 (Prybil and Starkweather 1976; Ritvo 1980 (Pfeffer 1973; Alexander and Fennell 1986; Fennell and Alexander 1987; Starkweather 1988 We contend that such an approach would provide a much more dynamic picture of hospital governance than has been seen, in that the interplay of board structure, hospital structure, and larger hospital context would become much clearer than before. Hospital boards take many different roles and change structures under different sets of conditions. Given the rapidity of change in the current hospital environment, an examination of the dynamics of board structure influence on organizational change, and of ways in which the structures themselves change over time, would contribute greatly to our understanding of larger, systemwide changes in health care.
